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A Toothless Tiger: President Uribe's
Proposed Amnesty Bill
By SARAH R. SANDFORD-SMITH*
From July 1996 to June 2003, at least 1,776 persons were victims of
torture [in Colombia]. Of them, 242 were tortured and left alive and
1,534 were tortured before they were murdered... 63.63% of all the acts
of torture committed during the period under study were attributed to
State agents: cases of direct perpetration represented 12.04% (214 cases)
and cases through omission, tolerance, acquiescence or support to
violations committed by paramilitary groups represented 51.57% (916
cases). 5.68% of the cases (101 victims) were attributed to the guerilla
groups.
Overview
On August 21, 2003, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe presented a
bill to his Congress that would allow certain paramilitary leaders to avoid
prison for human rights violations . After a trial conviction, amnesty
would be conditioned upon the payment of a sum of money to certain
organizations set up to compensate the victims of these crimes. Other
restraints placed upon these paramilitary leaders include remaining in
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005. Ms.
Sandford-Smith would like to thank her family and Jaime Lee Batt for their support. Ms.
Sandford-Smith is Editor-in-Chief of the Hastings International and Comparative Law
Review; this article was chosen for publication by a previous editorial board.
1. ComSI&N COLOMBIANA DE JURISTAS, ALTERNATE TO THE THIRD PERIODIC REPORT
SUBMITTED BY THE COLOMBIAN STATE TO THE COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE 9 (Oct. 2003)
[hereinafter COLOMBIAN COMMISSION REPORT] (explaining that these statistics must be
"understood as a minimal recording, not as definitive data for the total number of victims,"
because these types of violations rarely get reported).
2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLOMBIA'S CHECKBOOK IMPUNITY - A BRIEFING PAPER 1
(Sept. 22, 2003)], available at <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/americas/checkbook-
impunity.pdf> [hereinafter BRIEFING PAPER].
3. Editorial, Colombia's Peace Bargain, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2003, at A22.
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Colombia, and the inability to hold, or run for, a public office.4
According to President Uribe, "the plan would deactivate a brutal
confederation of regional factions with 13,000 armed fighters, saving lives
and giving two leftist guerrilla groups that continue to wage war an
incentive to negotiate... 5  However, it could be urged that President
Uribe's bill was influenced by statements made by one of the members of
the largest paramilitary groups in Colombia, the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia (AUC), that there would be no negotiations if jail time
was involved. 6 Though applauded by many in the international world as
being tough on organized crime, President Uribe's bill demonstrates that
his government is heavily influenced by Colombia's paramilitary groups.
For the paramilitary leaders targeted by this bill, the law is nothing
more than a toothless tiger. Paramilitary leaders could avoid prison by
paying a fee, or by making reparations to the families of the victims. 7 This
fee would be nominal in comparison to the vast amounts of money that
many of these leaders have amassed through their connections to the drug-
trafficking industry. 8 Paramilitary leaders own approximately 40% of the
cocaine industry. 9 If this bill is passed, it is likely that the drug industry
would be subsidizing the human rights violations committed by
paramilitary leaders.
The United States also has a poor record when it comes to ignoring the
human rights crisis in Colombia. Although the United States has supported
Plan Colombia, 0 the Plan merely aggravates the cycle of human rights
violations."l Furthermore, the United States government helped draft this
4. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 2, at 2.
5. Juan Forero, Colombia Chief Proposes Amnesty for Death Squads, DESERET
MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), Sept. 15, 2003, at A06.
6. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 2, at 3.
7. U.S./LABOR EDUCATION IN THE AMERICAS PROJECT, DEVELOPMENTS UNDER
PRESIDENT URIBE 1 (Jan. 2004).
8. See generally Francisco E. Thoumi, Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal
Economic Boom to Social Crisis, 582 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 102 (2002).
9. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 2, at 3.
10. See generally DEPARTMENT OF STATE/INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS -
THE U.S. AND COLOMBIA, U.S. SUPPORT FOR PLAN COLOMBIA, available at
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regionallar/colombia/wwwhpcus.htm> [hereinafter U.S. SUPPORT
FOR PLAN COLOMBIA].
11. The justification for the support of Plan Colombia is the United States' "War on
Drugs." However, by providing money to fight the drug industry, the United States is
creating a large underground market. Moreover, both paramilitary and guerilla groups are
responding to this market by trafficking more cocaine, and in the process, are responsible
for ongoing violations of human rights. This concept will be explored further in this note.
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impunity bill,' 2 even though some of the paramilitary members who this
bill addresses have been designated by the United States as terrorists. 
3
This note will offer two alternatives to President Uribe's proposed bill.
The first alternative is to have the United Nations step in and establish a
truth commission, much like the commission established in El Salvador.1
4
The second alternative is for the paramilitary and guerilla members to stand
trial before the International Criminal Court (ICC). Finally, this note will
argue that a truth commission is the better alternative.
I. A History of Abuse
Paramilitary members have plagued Colombian citizens for over three
decades.'5 The largest of these paramilitary groups is the AUC. The
United States has designated the AUC as a terrorist organization because of
the human rights violations that the AUC has committed.
16
Under Carlos Castafio, the leader of the AUC, Colombians who were
thought to share a leftist ideology were tortured and slaughtered.' 7 Some of
these gross violations of human liberties suffered under Castafio include:
the assassination of two presidential candidates,' 8 a plethora of village
massacres,' 9 and the murders of guerilla supporters, sympathizers, and their
families. Specifically,
[o]n February 18, 2000, some 300 armed men belonging to the ACCU
[what is now part of the AUC] set up a kangaroo court in the village of
El Salado, Bolivar. For the next two days, they tortured, garroted,
stabbed, decapitated, and shot residents. Witnesses told investigators
that they tied one six-year-old girl to a pole and suffocated her with a
plastic bag .... "To them it was like a big party," a survivor told the New
York Times. "They drank and danced and cheered as they butchered us
like hogs."
20
Human rights workers, and workers in the educational field, have also been
12. Forero, supra note 5.
13. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FACT SHEET: SECRETARY OF STATE DESIGNATES
FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (FTOs), (Oct. 5, 2001) [hereinafter FACT SHEET].
14. DAVID WEISSBRODT, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND
PROCESS 384 n. 3 (3d ed. 2001).
15. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 2, at 4-6.
16. FACT SHEET, supra note 13.
17. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 2, at 5.
18. Id. at 6-7.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 9-10.
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targeted by Castafio and his other paramilitary allies.2'
It has been contended that President Uribe, though once touted as
being hard on those who commit violations of human rights, has turned his
head from the actions of these paramilitary groups.22 Moreover, members
of the Colombian military view the AUC and other paramilitary groups as
allies against guerilla forces.23 As a result, Colombian citizens have
become victims to both governmental and non-governmental oppression.
II. The Nexus Between Human Rights Violations and the Drug
Industry
The fee that paramilitary leaders will have to pay as reparations, and
to avoid prison, will be nominal considering the money many paramilitary
members have amassed through their connections to drug traffickers.24
Colombia is the largest exporter of cocaine, and it is estimated that
paramilitary leaders control close to half of the cocaine exporting
business.25 Where does this money go? Money received from the drug
industry goes to supplying the paramilitary leaders with weapons, as
payments for loyalties, and for use as bribes or threats.
26
The link between the cocaine exporting business and paramilitary
groups is closely-bound. In areas where coca is grown, paramilitary groups
act as mini-governmental regimes, using their police power to govern the
production of cocaine, and exacting taxes from the population for the
production and exportation of the narcotic.27 Although the paramilitary
leaders rule with an iron hand, they manage to keep the loyalties of the
peasants through fear and bribery. The paramilitary groups provide
education, food, and hospitals for the peasants working in the area, with the
understanding that certain standards are to be followed.28 The cheap labor
of the peasants affords the paramilitary leaders the ability to earn a
handsome profit. The money received from this system would be used to
pay the proposed fee.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See generally Andrew Miller, Point/Counterpoint: US. Military Support for Plan
Colombia: Adding Fuel to Fire, 8 HuM. RTS. BR. 8 (2000) (discussing the relationship
between high ranking military officials and the paramilitary).
24. Thoumi, supra note 8, at 106-07.
25. Scott Wilson, Cocaine Trade Causes Rifts in Colombian War, WASH. POST, Sept.
17, 2002, at A22.
26. Thoumi, supra note 8, at 111-112.
27. Wilson, supra note 25.
28. Thoumi, supra note 8, at 111.
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The United States Congress has also found that some of these
paramilitary members are major traffickers of cocaine to the United
States.29 Congress has asked President Uribe to have two of these leaders
extradited. 30 However, President Uribe explained to Congress that he has
already extradited other paramilitary members who Congress had requested
and was not going to extradite these two particular individuals (Carlos
Castafio and Salvatore Mancuso).3t It is curious why President Uribe
would extradite ninety-four other paramilitary members with links to drug
trafficking 32 and not these two. It is probable that these leaders have ties
with other paramilitary personnel such that President Uribe is afraid to
confront them. Both Castafio and Mancuso have been convicted and
sentenced to prison but have managed to avoid serving any time.33
If certain military members wish to avoid the hassle of a trial under
this bill, they could, instead, use the money they would have used for the
impunity fee to threaten witnesses. This is not an uncommon practice.
Aside from supplying their weapons, paramilitary groups also use the
money from the drug industry to avoid prosecution. Thus,"[t]he judiciary is
virtually powerless as a result of decades of death threats and payoffs from
drug traffickers, and today less than three percent of crimes are
successfully prosecuted. 34 With an industry that takes in over two billion
dollars a year, it is not difficult to imagine the illegal drug industry funding
the avoidance of a trial.35
III. United States Involvement with the Human Rights
Violations and Impunity
A. How does Plan Colombia Relate to this Bill?
Plan Colombia was developed by Colombia's government to address
certain problems in Colombia, such as combating drug trafficking and
reviving the Colombian economy and society. 36 On July 13, 2000, after
29. All Things Considered, Uribe Defends Colombia's Amnesty Program (National




33. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 2, at 6-13.
34. Alan Seagrave, Conflict in Colombia: How can Rebel Forces, Paramilitary Groups,
Drug Traffickers, and Government Forces be Held Liable for Human Rights Violations in a
Country Where Impunity Reigns Supreme?, 25 NOVA L. REv. 525, 527 (2001).
35. Thoumi, supra note 8, at 109.
36. U.S. SUPPORT FOR PLAN COLOMBIA, supra note 10.
2004]
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approval by the U.S. Congress, President Clinton signed into law an
assistance package to support Plan Colombia. 37  The assistant package
consisted of $1.3 billion dollars in aid to Colombia.38 This support by the
United States was designed to help the drug trafficking problem, as well as
to protect human rights and to further the peace process in Colombia.39
Of the designated aid, "[a]pproximately seventy-five percent of Plan
Colombia aid is earmarked to provide weapons and training to Colombian
military and police forces in the fight against narcotrafficking.
' 4°
Unfortunately, this money had the effect of creating an underground market
for the drug traffickers:
In contrast to U.S. consumers, the U.S. government is directly and
consciously implicated in the Colombian human rights crisis by
providing training and military hardware for Colombian military forces
and, by logical extension, for their paramilitary allies. It is important to
mention that the only reason U.S. consumers are involved is because
Drug War policies have succeeded in creating a growing and
astronomically profitable illegal market that, among other unpleasant
things, is fueling Colombia's human rights crisis.
4 1
Both the paramilitary and the guerilla forces are deeply involved with
the drug trafficking industry, and have been the cause of thousands of
extrajudicial killings and massacres.42 While reducing the supply of crops
was one result of Plan Colombia, another result was a growing number of
human rights violations. According to the U.S. Department of State's
Human Rights Report on Colombia, released in 2001, the human rights
record of the Colombian government did not change for the better.43 High-
ranking military officials (whose offices received much of the aid) were




40. Winifred Tate, Repeating Past Mistakes: Aiding Counterinsurgency in Colombia,
34 No. 2 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 16 (2000).
41. John Barry, From Drug War to Dirty War: Plan Colombia and the US. Role in
Human Rights Violations in Colombia, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 177
(Spring 2002).
42. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDs
COLOMBIA AND OTHER RELATED ISSUES (submitted to the Congress by the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, pursuant to House Conference Report
107-593 accompanying HR 4775 enacted as the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act P.L.
107-206) (Feb. 3, 2003), available at <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rpt/17140.htm>.
43. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES,




groups.44 In a less-than secret manner, the United States realized that
human rights violations were still being committed, but discarded that fact
for what it believed was a greater goal. When General Barry McCaffrey
was the U.S. Drug Czar, a spokesperson for his office explained that,
"[y]ou don't hold up the major objective of drug supply control to achieve
minor human rights. '45 The blatant disregard of the United States for the
welfare of the Colombian people is astounding.
Many of the paramilitary leaders who committed these atrocities are
the individuals whom President Uribe's bill addresses. Not only are these
leaders benefited by the financial aid from Plan Colombia, but they are now
being offered amnesty for their crimes.
B. United States Looking out for its own Interests
As previously mentioned, the United States is alleged to have helped
President Uribe draft this bill.46 Why would the United States want to
contribute to the amnesty of paramilitary leaders whom it has pegged as
terrorists? There are a few possible answers to this. The first has to do
with the United States' fear of ICC jurisdiction. After a discussion with
President Bush on October 1, 2003, President Uribe signed a declaration
stating that Colombia would protect Americans in Colombia from being
subject to the ICC. 4 7 By signing this, President Uribe is guaranteeing
continuing financial aid to the Colombian military, because President Bush
had threatened to cut off aid to countries who would not sign bilateral
immunity agreements.48 President Bush offered Colombia both a carrot
and a stick; support for the immunity bill and financial assistance if
Colombian President Uribe signed the bilateral immunity agreement, and
loss of aid if Colombia did not sign. As a result of these manipulative
tactics, Americans do not have to worry about ICC jurisdiction for crimes
committed in Colombia.
The second answer as to why the United States is helping President
Uribe with this bill has to do with the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA). The Bush administration wants to negotiate with Colombia to
"open markets to U.S. goods and services. ' 49  Promising financial
44. Id.
45. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (2001),
available at <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/americas/index.html>.
46. Forero, sapra note 5.
47. All Things Considered, supra note 29.
48. Latin America: Justice or Impunity? CATH. NEW TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at 8.
49. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUSH BUDGET PLAN PROPOSES $463 MILLION FOR
COLOMBIA IN FY 2005, available at <http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2004/Feb/04-
2004]
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assistance to Colombia is a good way to negotiate with President Uribe. In
his budget for 2005, President Bush has Colombia's Government slated to
receive $463 million, and has an additional $731 million designated to the
Andean region for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative.5" This money
almost ensures Colombian compliance with the FTAA.
Unfortunately, the United States is not looking out for the interests of
the Colombian citizens. Because much of the money given to the
Colombian government is for military purposes, Colombians need to be on
their guard. The military and the paramilitary groups are strongly linked,
as evidenced by their collusion in fighting counterinsurgent operations, and
by the government's acquiescence to the actions of paramilitary groups. 51
According to United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Colombia, "[i]n many of these areas, the paramilitaries have replaced the
Government in important aspects of public life, including the use of armed
force. 52 As a result, much of the money the United States puts into the
Colombian military funds paramilitary activities. Unless the United States
changes its policies with regards to Colombia, Colombians must continue
to worry for their safety.
IV. Problems with the Bill
It could be asserted that the trials required by this bill would be similar
to the fact-finding process of a truth commission. Witnesses and victims
would testify to the horrors they have seen and/or felt, thereby eliminating
the need for an independent truth commission. However, there are
problems with assuming the trials will serve as truth-seeking tribunals.
First, the Colombian government has already given judicial police powers
to the military, and the military justice system asserts jurisdiction over
cases where military members (with connections to the paramilitary
members) are being tried.53 Also, paramilitary members threaten the lives
of prosecutors, human rights defenders and testifying witnesses,54 so that
the witnesses are either too frightened to actually testify, or are killed.
Additionally, previous trials of some of the paramilitary members have
proven fruitless in their acquisition of truth, so it is unlikely that the trials
321472.html>.
50. Id.
5 1. COLOMBIAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 56-58.
52. Id. at 56.
53. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER PRESIDENT URIBE, supra note 7.
54. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, COLUMBIA: LATEST VOTE BY CONGRESS IS A LICENSE




under this bill would fare any better.
Colombian military officials have the power to hold suspects without
judicial review (for a certain number of days), as well as the power to
interrogate these suspects.55 The judicial powers that have been given to
the military allow Colombian military officials and their paramilitary
conspirators to detain human rights investigators and witnesses in an effort
to intimidate them. 56  Also, the collusion between the military and
paramilitary forces has created a system whereby those under the
jurisdiction of the military justice system can successfully evade
conviction, and even be promoted. 57 For example, General Quifi6nez was
charged with murdering unionists, human rights workers, and other
community leaders between 1991 and 1992.58 Though a civilian judge was
sure Quifi6nez would be convicted because of the mountain of evidence
against him, the military tribunal found insufficient evidence to convict,
and then promoted Quifi6nez to commander.5 9 On July 6, 2001, formal
investigations against Quifi6nez were commenced to establish whether he
had participated, along with paramilitary members, in a massacre in
Chengue. 60 Five months later, Quifi6nez was promoted again, but this time
to a diplomatic post. One year later, Quifionez received the Order of
Boyacd Medal.6' It could be argued that the promotions of Quifi6nez were
a way to get him out of Colombia (his diplomatic post was in Israel).
However, what is important to note is that the military justice system did
not punish him - in the end, he was rewarded with a medal.
The Fiscalia General de la Nacion (Fiscalia) is the Colombian entity
charged with the duty of looking into and prosecuting all crimes.62 The
Fiscalia is also responsible for investigating human rights violations.
63
However, according to reports received by Amnesty International:
[T]he Fiscalia is apparently seeking to block or hinder investigation into
human rights violations in which senior military officers are implicated.
Prosecutors working on such cases have frequently been removed from
55. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SECURITY AT WHAT COST?, at 5 available at
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAMR23132002> (visited Nov. 17, 2003).
56. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, LATEST VOTE BY CONGRESS IS A LICENSE FOR THE
MILITARY TO FLOUT HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 54.
57. SECURITY AT WHAT COST?, supra note 55, at 5.




62. Id. at 8.
63. Id.
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cases or unjustifiably dismissed from their posts while also facing death
threats. Witnesses and colleagues working on these investigations have
also been killed. This raises concerns that the Fiscalia has failed to
guarantee the safety of its public prosecutors and witnesses.
64
Moreover, even if the prosecutors are not being killed, they are being
relieved of their duties to investigate the activities of military and
paramilitary members. 65 There is no effective system of justice when it
comes to prosecuting the military and paramilitary members. In a two-year
period, from December 1999 to February 2002, arrest warrants for
paramilitary members only increased by 45%, while arrest warrants for
guerrilla members increased by 237%.66
Prosecutors and witnesses are not the only ones subject to these
67horrors. Human rights activists are also targets. In Colombia, over
fifteen human rights defenders have been murdered since August 2002.68 It
is hard to imagine that victims or witnesses will be ready to testify at the
trials of some of these paramilitary members after hearing of the fates of
their peers.
The previous trials of paramilitary members have also proven to be
lacking in the area of truth-finding, or bringing the paramilitary members to
justice. As previously mentioned, witnesses who were going to testify
would be killed before they had the chance to take the stand.69
Additionally, some of the paramilitary members who would be affected by
this bill have already been convicted and sentenced to prison.70 However,
they have been able to escape prison by utilizing their network of
paramilitary and military allies. Unfortunately for Colombians, the justice
system has been unable to deal with the paramilitary groups.
Another problem with this bill stems not from the truth-seeking
process (or lack thereof), but from the legality of the amnesty. According
to a number of cases decided by the Inter-American Commission and Court
of Human rights, there are certain guidelines when it comes to granting
amnesty:
(1) To be legally valid at all, amnesties must be adopted by democratic
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 9.
67. AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL, AMERICAS: HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS: PERSECUTION
REACHES EMERGENCY PROPORTIONS (Oct. 11, 2003), available at
<http://news.amnesty.org/mavp/news.nsfiVwPrint/E513C9FDAE731E7C80256DDA0035>.
68. Id. at 1.
69. SECURITY AT WHAT COST?, supra note 55, at 16.
70. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 2, at 6-13.
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bodies, usually the legislature; self-amnesties by lawless regimes are not
valid.
(2) Amnesties may not foreclose investigations of violations, sufficient
to vindicate both society's right to know the truth and the survivors' right
to know what happened to their relatives.
(3) Amnesties must not preclude victims from initiating or participating
in judicial criminal investigations, at least in states that have such
procedures.
(4) Amnesties may not foreclose or in practical effect substantially limit
the right of victims or survivors to obtain adequate compensation for
violations.
(5) Amnesties must not apply to crimes against humanity.
(6) Amnesties should not apply to perjury and other obstructions of
justice by officers of the court and litigants.
(7) Amnesties should not be given without an acknowledgement by the
state of responsibility for past violations.
(8) Investigations must seek to identify those responsible and name
names; otherwise they are insufficient.
(9) States must prosecute and punish perpetrators of serious human rights
violations; they may not be amnestied.
7 1
It is clear from the examples above that many of the paramilitary
leaders have committed gross human rights violations, and, according to
guidelines (5) and (9) above, should not be granted amnesty. It is also
evident that President Uribe's bill does not sufficiently allow victims to
come forward with the truth (in violation of guidelines (2) and (8)), because
the victims still need to fear for their lives if the paramilitary leaders who
committed these violations are granted amnesty. The bill also does not
allow for accountability. 72 For all these reasons, a different solution to
Colombia's crisis must be adopted.
71. DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 14, at 385 (quoting Douglass Cassel, Lessons
from the Americas: Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties for Atrocities, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (Fall 1996)).
72. Letter from Jim McGovern, U.S. House of Representatives, to Colin Powell,
Secretary of State (Jan. 13, 2004).
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V. Two Possible Solutions
A. A United Nations Truth Commission
A truth commission serves many different functions. First, it gives
validation to the victims and their family members. By recognizing the
bloodshed, a truth commission could allow Colombia to recognize its past,
and allow it to move forward. Furthermore, a truth commission can give
international recognition to the crisis that is occurring in Colombia, thereby
encouraging international assistance.
By allowing the paramilitary leaders to escape virtually untouched,
President Uribe is sending a message to the international world that he does
not have the clout to enforce internationally recognized standards of human
rights. In order to gain credibility, President Uribe himself could facilitate
the organization of a Colombian truth commission to investigate the crimes
committed by the military, the paramilitary, and the guerilla forces. Rather
than having the United Nations organize a truth commission, if it were
established by President Uribe, it would more likely show the international
community that Colombia was taking responsibility for violations of
human rights. For example, when establishing the South African Truth
Commission, President Mandela first appointed the head of the commission
and then enabled the citizens of South Africa to vote for the rest of the
members.73 President Uribe could imitate this method, and allow the
Colombians to select the members of the commission. Because of the
different political factions in Colombia, allowing the citizens to vote for
their truth-finders could ensure that the citizens would feel comfortable
speaking to the people they elect.
However, there is the possibility that paramilitary members will still
be able to intimidate people from coming forward. If citizens are allowed
to vote for the people who serve on the commission, it is likely that
paramilitary members or their allies will hold positions on the commission.
If this occurs, then they would have access to the lists of people coming
forward to testify, and could either kill those people or otherwise prevent
them from coming forward. Moreover, with the corruption that is currently
present in the government,74 it is likely that the only people who would be
allowed to come forward would be members of the guerilla groups to
confess or victims of those subjected to the crimes of the guerilla groups.
73. Paul Lansing & Julie C. King, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission: The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National Healing in the Post-
ApartheidAge, 15 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 753, 763 (1998).
74. COLOMBIAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 56.
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President Uribe could also ask the United Nations to step in and create
a truth commission in Colombia as it did in El Salvador.75  Because
Colombia has ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 76 the United
Nations has the authority to step in.
The ICESCR and the ICCPR recognize the basic rights of the
individual. Among the rights recognized by the ICESCR are the right to
self-determination, the right to form and join trade unions, and the right to
the highest standard of physical and mental health. 7  The ICCPR
recognizes rights such as the right to determine political status, the right to
liberty, and most importantly, the right to life - regardless of political
views.78 However, these rights mentioned above are not respected in
Colombia.79 Citizens who attempt to join unions are thought to be aligned
with the guerilla forces and are either murdered, intimidated, or otherwise
prevented from joining these unions (the perpetrators of this violence are
both the military and paramilitary members).80 Moreover, the military and
the paramilitary do not respect the right to life when the views of the
citizens are not pro-government or pro-military. Both the ICESCR and the
ICCPR prescribe the means to establish committees to investigate State
Parties that are reported to be in violation of both covenants.
Article Two of the CAT also speaks to the rights of the individual, but
in relation to being free from torture. The Article states: "Each State Party
shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to
prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction."
8'
75. The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador was established by the United
Nations to investigate the violence, which occurred during an eleven year period. DAVID
WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 14, at 384.
76. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (June 9, 2004),
available at <http://www.unhcr.ch/pdf/report.pdf> [hereinafter STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS].
77. See generally OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Jan. 3 1976),
available at <http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm>.
78. See generally OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (Mar. 23, 1976), available at
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr/htm>.
79. See generally COLOMBIAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1.
80. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER PRESIDENT URIBE, supra note 7, at 2.
81. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT, ART. 2 (June 26, 1987), available at
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Unfortunately, Colombia has not sought to prevent the acts of torture by the
82military and paramilitary forces. As a party to the CAT, Colombia is in
violation of this article. Additionally, Article Four of the CAT explains
that the State Parties need to ensure that offenses of torture do not go
unpunished and that appropriate penalties are doled out.83 This bill by
President Uribe would, in effect, be forgiving perpetrators of torture
without any penalty. Though it could be argued that the monetary sum the
paramilitary members would have to pay constitutes a penalty, the CAT
requires that the penalty is appropriate to the gravity of the harm inflicted
by the torture. 84 It is difficult to pass the straight-face test to claim that any
monetary sum would be a sufficient penalty for some of the crimes of
torture that have been committed (suffocating a small child with a paper
bag, 5 hanging up people on meat hooks,86 etc.). After describing the
actions a State Party needs to do to prevent torture, the Convention sets out
guidelines for the United Nations Committee against Torture (Committee),
as a means of addressing these types of human rights violations. The
Committee has the authority to make investigations into a State Party if
there are reports of torture or other types of cruel punishment.87 This,
along with the power granted to the United Nations from the ICESCR and
the ICCPR, is where the authority for a United Nations truth commission in
Colombia derives.
The U.N. committee in Colombia could be composed of members of
the United Nations, appointed by the Secretary General. This would
eliminate the problem of corruption and intimidation, which could occur
with a Colombian-organized commission. Additionally, the United
Nations committee could attempt to get the Colombian government, the
paramilitary forces, and the guerilla forces to agree to negotiations during
this process, as the committee collects information. It is possible that these
groups would agree to negotiations because they have already started the
process of laying down their weapons.88
A United Nations truth commission would also be free from political
strife. This is especially important in Colombia, where allegations of bias
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm> [hereinafter CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE].
82. COLOMBIAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1.
83. See CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 81.
84. Id.
85. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 2, at 9.
86. Id. at 8.
87. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 81, art. 20.
88. Eric Green, OAS Reports on New Effort to Help Bring Peace to Colombia, WASH.
FILE, Feb. 5, 2004.
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(with a Colombian-created truth commission) could be debilitating to the
truth commission. If the guerrilla groups decided there was bias, they
would just return to fighting.
However, there are also problems inherent with a truth commission.
Colombia is currently in a state of unrest. Between the military and
paramilitary members, and the guerilla forces, Colombians have to sleep
with one eye open. A problem with the truth commission would be
determining when to cut off the investigations. Because the conflict is still
happening, the truth commission would have virtually no ending point in
its search for the truth. Hostilities between the groups in Colombia would
need to end - otherwise the job of the truth commission would never be
completed.
Additionally, there is currently little incentive for the military and the
paramilitary members to stop their violence. Colombia is the third largest
recipient of monetary aid from the United States.89 Much of this money
goes into funding the military in its fight against Marxist-guerrillas. 90 Why
would the military stop fighting when it is receiving money for its cause?
Furthermore, if the military and paramilitary members do not cease their
hostilities, the guerrilla groups will not be able to do so either, because it
would be suicide. The funding of the Colombian military by the United
States thus creates a vicious cycle. As long as the United States keeps
shoving money into the Colombian military, the paramilitary groups will be
able to maintain their stronghold, and a truth commission would be almost
useless.
In order to deal with these possible problems, a United Nations truth
commission would need to address the United States' role in the
commission of human rights violations. Recognizing the human rights
violations that are occurring in Colombia, without identifying the monetary
sources and policies that aid in the commission of these violations, will not
stop the problems. This is one reason why a United Nations truth
commission would be the best solution. Any other truth commission
established by the Colombian government might decide not to
acknowledge the role the United States has had for fear of having their aid
cut off, as opposed to redirected. 9'
89. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
90. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY, JUST THE FACTS: A CIVILIAN'S GUIDE TO U.S.
DEFENSE AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (Dec. 18,
2003), available at <http://www.ciponline.org/facts/co.htm>.
91. For example, for 2004, the United States requested $552.59 million dollars for
military and police aid to Colombia, while it requested only $135.70 million to be used for
social and economic aid. Id.
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B. ICC Jurisdiction
Another alternative to President Uribe's proposed bill is to have the
ICC act as a tribunal for the crimes committed by the paramilitary and
guerilla members. The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity
committed by both state and non-state actors. 92 Moreover, ICC jurisdiction
seems to fit the problems that arise from this bill, because the ICC was
designed to "provide an alternative to impunity where independent and
effective judicial systems are not available." 93 After a referral from the
Security Council, State Party, or the prosecutor, the ICC has jurisdiction if
the conduct is by someone who resides in the State that has ratified the
ICC, or if the conduct occurred on the territory of a State that has ratified
the ICC.
94
On August 5, 2002, Colombia ratified the ICC, so it is subject to its
jurisdiction for crimes committed in Colombia or by Colombians.95 Also,
on that same day, Colombia exercised its option under the Rome Statute to
opt out of war crimes jurisdiction for seven years.96 However, this
exemption does not apply to the crimes against humanity that have been
committed by the paramilitary and guerilla members that President Uribe's
bill addresses.
Article 77 of the Rome Statute provides for the penalties that would be
applicable to many of the paramilitary and guerilla leaders.97 These
include:
(a) Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed
a maximum of 30 years; or
(b) A term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of
the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.
(2) In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order:
(a) A fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence;
92. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
183/9 (1998), art. 7 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
93. DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 14, at 419 (quoting Jerry Fowler, The Rome
Treaty for an International Criminal Court: A Framework of International Justice for
Future Generations, 6 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (Fall 1998)).
94. Id.
95. STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS, supra note 76, at 3.
96. Latin America: Justice or Impunity?, supra note 48.
97. Rome Statute, supra note 92, art. 77.
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(b) A forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or
indirectly from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide
third parties.
98
Moreover, Article 78 states that when sentencing an individual found
guilty by the ICC, factors such as the gravity of the crime and whether the
individual has served any previous time, will be taken into account.99 In
addition to punishing the perpetrators of serious violations of human rights,
the ICC also has the ability to order reparations to the victims.' 00
The ICC seems to provide the safety that Colombian courts cannot
provide. An international tribunal, as opposed to a local one, would not
carry the risks of violence that are inherent to Colombia.'0 °  Neither
witnesses nor prosecutors would have to fear for their lives. Moreover, the
collusion between the government and the paramilitary leaders would be
absent in an international tribunal.
The ICC also appears to redress the victims better than a truth
commission could.10 2  Instead of merely allowing the victims to come
forward and tell their stories, the ICC could order jail terms for the
perpetrators of some of these atrocities. This aspect of justice is absent
with a truth commission. Moreover, if the ICC finds the abusers guilty, the
ICC does not grant the amnesty, which seems innate with the truth
commission. It is possible that a U.N. truth commission would not meet
the guidelines for granting amnesty set forth by the Inter-American
Commission and Court of Human Rights.10 3 This problem would not exist
with the ICC. If found guilty of human rights violations, these paramilitary
and guerilla leaders would be sitting in jail.
As promising as it may sound, there are setbacks attached to
jurisdiction by the ICC. The first of which is that the tribunal only has
jurisdiction over crimes that were committed after the Rome Statute came
into effect, on July 1, 2002.1'4 Hence, while a truth commission could go
98. Id.
99. Id. art. 78.
100. Id. art. 75.
101. As previously mentioned, both witnesses and prosecutors in local tribunals are
threatened and/or killed.
102. While a truth commission could acknowledge the United States' role in Colombia,
its powers are limited. The ICC has the authority to sentence perpetrators, as well as to
provide for reparations to the victims and their families.
103. See infra, Part V. However, it is unlikely that a U.N. truth commission would be
held to the same standards as a locally established commission. A truth commission created
by a neutral tribunal would lack the corruption inherent with a local tribunal.
104. Rome Statute, supra note 92, arts. 11, 126.
2004]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
back almost indefinitely, the ICC would be limited to crimes that happened
within the past year and a half. This would ignore many of the human
rights violations that have been committed by the paramilitary and guerilla
members and additionally, ignore many of the victims. Unfortunately,
there is no way around this time restriction.
Another problem with the ICC is that it is questionable whether its
jurisdiction would reach to explore the aid the United States has given to
the Colombian military. 10 5 The ICC functions as a regular court, and if the
United States did not commit the human rights violations itself, it is
unlikely that the extent of U.S. involvement would be uncovered.
Moreover, the United States has not ratified the ICC, and has also signed a
bilateral immunity agreement with Colombia. 10 6 Therefore, even if the ICC
could investigate into Plan Colombia and U.S. assistance, it would not have
jurisdiction to suggest a change in any of the U.S. policies.
A further setback with the ICC is that it requires the accused be
present at the trial. 107 Many of the paramilitary and guerilla members have
thus far been able to avoid showing up for trials and have evaded prison for
a number of years. 10 8 These individuals were convicted in abstensia in
Colombia because they refused to show up.' 09 If these same individuals
refused to participate in the ICC, they would go unpunished. It is for all
these reasons that the ICC, although a better alternative than the proposed
bill, would not sufficiently address the problems in Colombia.
Conclusion
A United Nations truth commission is the best alternative to President
Uribe's proposed bill. Acknowledging the atrocities suffered by many
Colombian citizens would strengthen the democracy, and give President
Uribe international credibility. Ignoring the violations and allowing
paramilitary leaders to pay a fee to prevent prison is in effect letting the
cocaine industry subsidize gross violations of human rights.
It is still possible to be optimistic. After the elections on October 28,
2003, and with the first leftist politicians in office, the chances of creating
105. The ICC requires the defendant to be present before the tribunal. Rome Statute,
supra note 92, art. 63(1). Also, President Uribe has signed a bilateral immunity agreement
with the United States. All Things Considered, supra note 29. Therefore, it is unlikely that
the ICC would recognize the United States' involvement with Colombia.
106. Latin America: Justice or Impunity?, supra note 48.
107. Rome Statute, supra note 92, art. 63.
108. BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 2, at 6-13.
109. Id.
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something like a truth commission in Colombia seem to be less distant.
Moreover, the situation in Colombia is starting to gain an international
audience. With enough international criticism, it is possible that the United
States would stop funding the Colombian military, or would redirect the
bulk of the money into social programs. Either way, an international
backlash would signal to the United States that it needs to change its
hypocritical stance towards its policies in Colombia. The situation in
Colombia does not have to be a vicious cycle of violence. There are
members of the U.N. Human Rights Committee with experience organizing
truth commissions. Colombia just needs a shove in the right direction, and
because of its ratification of the ICESCR, the ICCPR and CAT, the United
Nations can do just that.

